SBVR — description of the type theory of SBVR needs to be included in 10.1.1

This sentence appears near the end of 10.1.1: "We do not adopt a type theory such as Russell’s type theory, where each set may belong only to a set of a higher type." This is about all that is said in section 10 about the theory of types in SBVR. When I asked about the failure to include a description of SBVR's type theory, Tony said that the reason there was no description of SBVR's type theory was that there is no type theory in SBVR, or something to that effect. While it may be true that SBVR does not allow a hierarchy of degrees of types like that of Russel, and does not admit statements about whether or not sets can be members of themselves, it is not true that SBVR has no theory of concepts, which correspond to types. SBVR contains several asserted or implied general conditions on relationships among concepts. Should these be pointed out and tied to formal logic in section 10? The interpretation of a conceptual model that is described in terms of SBVR's vocabularies is crucially dependent on how SBVR formally regards the notions of consistency and unification of the concepts in the conceptual model, as a set of types.

Here are some questions that such a logical grounding of SBVR concepts might be expected to answer: How is the logical consistency of concepts to be determined? What is the most general concept? Under what conditions can new concepts be admitted into a conceptual schema or into a possible world? How are these rules affected by open/closed world assumptions? How is it determined if a set of concepts is well formed?

Some entries whose definitions, notes, and necessities bear on these questions are 'thing', 'concept', 'concept type', 'concept generalizes concept', 'intensional definition', 'delimiting characteristic', 'concept is closed in conceptual schema', 'fact type is internally closed in conceptual schema', and others.

closed, no change